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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2007 marked the fortieth anniversary of Loving v. Virginia,1 
in which the Supreme Court denounced antimiscegenation law and policy. 
I argue here that Loving was wrongly decided. I argue against the 
fundamental right to marriage declared in Loving, and offer alternative 
interpretations of the harms and rights at issue in the case. 
 
 
 ∗ © Tucker Culbertson. Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and Culture, Columbia Law 
School; Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, San Francisco State University; Ph.D. 
Student, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, UC-Berkeley; J.D. (2005), Boalt Hall School of 
Law, UC-Berkeley. 
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Rosenbury, and Ann Scales for their instruction, inspiration, and example.  
 1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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In renouncing traditional prohibitions of heteroracial marriage and 
mixing, the Court should have renounced all governmental traditions that 
privilege civil marriage. The Court should have wholly up-ended (instead 
of only amending) the benefits and burdens of Virginia’s discriminatory 
civil marriage regime. 
Homoracial Heterosexual civil marriage advanced the peculiar ideals, 
interests, identities, and institutions of particular classes and cultures, 
attempting to manifest through flesh the fantasies of White Supremacy, 
and thereby harming persons and peoples involved in heteroracial, 
Homosexual, polygamous, unmarried, and other ways of living and 
loving.2 Proper constitutional3 scrutiny of such privilege and prejudice 
must yield more than intermittent, incremental Constitutional4 
modification meant to enfranchise narrowly construed and newly 
sympathetic persons or practices (e.g., heteroracial and Homosexual 
couples and couplings) traditionally excluded from governmental benefit 
and recognition. Such a jurisprudence—which Loving typifies in many 
ways—is logically flawed, politically limiting, and constitutionally unfit. 
Through its declaration of marriage as a fundamental right and its 
condemnation of antimiscegenation laws as facially racial and purposively 
racist infringements on that right, Loving reifies the very ideals, interests, 
identities, and institutions that ought to be its objects of scrutiny. In this 
way, Loving typifies judicial analyses and jurisprudential ideologies of 
discrimination that often seem intended to obstruct, and are in any event 
unable to manifest, the profound Constitutional Reconstruction5 mandated 
by the Civil War Amendments.  
 
 
 2. By White Supremacy I mean any and all of the diverse schools of thought and states of 
affairs wherein Whiteness is alleged to be an actual and most excellent endowment that inheres in 
certain humans’ blood and culture, and which necessitates non-Whites’ subordination. By 
subordination I mean both:    
(1) the classification and pathologization of non-Whites as lower, lesser, underdeveloped, 
deformed, degraded or deficient as compared to Whites; and  
(2) the violent possession, suppression, exploitation, consumption, and destruction of non-
Whites as the righteous duty or legal right of Whites.  
I capitalize “White”, “White Supremacy”, and other categories and ideologies of identity. Doing 
otherwise would render them common nouns and adjectives, which might elide such categories’ and 
ideologies’ cultural specificity and diversity, which in my opinion could wrongly suggest that an 
identity (e.g. Whiteness) is empirically real, conceptually coherent, and wholly consistent in what it 
means and how it matters in different spaces and times.  
 3. I use “constitutionalism” to refer generally to interpretive textual practices through which 
political communities articulate and negotiate foundational dimensions of their relations.  
 4. I use “Constitutionalism” when referring to particular interpretive practices involving a 
particular constitutional text, here the United States Constitution. 
 5. At a minimum, I take Reconstruction to mean the United States government’s rejection of 
racial caste as moral law and public policy. Reconstruction, however, refers not merely to the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/3











In light of the foregoing argument that Loving perpetuates the very 
harms it claims to cure, I argue that the Supreme Court should have 
condemned Virginia’s homoracial Heterosexual civil marriage laws as an 
infringement not upon the fundamental right to marry, but rather upon the 
Lovings’ rights to the ends of marriage—such as erotic pleasures and 
communities of care, which for ease I refer to as the rights to sex and 
family. Doing so would avoid the nearsighted and naturalizing defense of 
marriage as such, which mistakes a governmental means for a 
constitutional end, and thus perpetuates and legitimates discrimination 
against those whose forms of sex and family remain unrecognized and/or 
prohibited by civil marriage regimes.  
Recognizing fundamental rights to the ends of civil marriage would 
enfranchise the liberty and equality Loving means to defend. Also, doing 
so more earnestly and explicitly identifies liberty interests that course 
through the United States’ fundamental rights doctrines, but are often 
under- or entirely un-articulated.6 In doctrines on procreation, 
contraception, abortion, sodomy, and other matters, we can clearly see 
what the courts rarely say: a consistent Constitutional investment in some 
subjects’ freedom to have sex and family. Constitutionalizing fundamental 
rights to sex and family, moreover, contributes to central debates in 
fundamental rights jurisprudence regarding the proper relevance of 
tradition and abstraction in ascertaining and articulating liberty interests as 
being Constitutionally fundamental. 
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I give an account of the rise 
of the fundamental right to marriage. I engage with majority and 
concurring opinions in seminal Supreme Court cases which share key 
analytical, historical, and political failings inherent in their defenses of 
marriage. I then discuss others’ criticisms of movements for “marriage 
equality,” thereby compiling problems that attend the instantiation of 
marriage as a fundamental right.  
I then argue that Constitutional scrutiny of civil marriage under the 
Fourteenth Amendment should be profoundly informed by the context of 
that amendment—our Constitutional Reconstruction. As an effectuation of 
Reconstruction, Justice Warren’s opinion in Loving is deficient. Justice 
 
 
Constitutional amendments and Congressional acts of the early postbellum era. Reconstruction also 
signifies the massive, uncharted, unchartable cultural transformation demanded by our c/Constitutional 
transformation regarding race, races, and racism. Such is the basis, in part, of the new Jurisprudence of 
Reconstruction among antisubordinationist critical legal scholars. See generally Keith Aoki, The 
Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996); Angela P. 
Harris, Forward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1995).  
 6. See infra notes 49–62 and accompanying text. 
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Warren cites the historically recognized, allegedly civilized “rights of 
man” as grounds for deeming Heterosexual marriage a fundamental 
Constitutional right. But the minimal meaning of the Reconstruction 
Amendments was the end of racial caste, which was historically not only 
coincident with, but also at the core of, modern Euro-American 
conceptions of the fundamental, natural, civilized “rights of man.”7 Justice 
Warren’s faith in the traditional Euro-American “rights of man” should 
have been more greatly shaken by the radical fact of our Constitutional 
Reconstruction.  
In Part III, I attempt to reconstruct Loving. I note first that my critique 
of Loving resembles countless contributions from critical 
antisubordination theorists on the violent legal construction of race, sex, 
gender, class, religion, and color (to only begin the list). In identifying 
these long standing lines of legal analysis by historical materialists, 
feminists, critical race theorists, and others, I establish an academic 
schema into which my particular arguments about Loving clearly fall.  
I then expand my analytical criticisms of Loving and the jurisprudence 
on marriage from the prior section, arguing that marriage cannot in fact be 
a fundamental right, because it is actually an institutional means to 
c/Constitutional ends and not a c/Constitutional end in itself, and is neither 
a necessary nor sufficient means to its c/Constitutional ends.  
Next, I discuss the broad political ramifications of framing the injury in 
Loving as one of access to marriage. Many forms of sex and family (and 
other imaginable ends of marriage) are still unjustly refused, neglected, 
burdened, disparaged, and otherwise injured by any (including Loving’s 
colorblind Heterosexual) civil marriage regime.  
I finally argue that there are uniquely constitutional questions raised by 
the analytical and political errors of Loving’s fundamental rights analysis. 
Given the import of Reconstruction, and the example of doctrines on 
marriage, I argue that our fundamental Constitutional rights must not be 
tied too closely to fixed identity classes, present state practices, national 
traditions, or overly specific descriptions of liberty.  
 
 
 7. I discuss the Fourteenth Amendment’s and the Reconstruction Constitution’s profound 
departure from Enlightenment and Modern Euroamerican politics and philosophy infra notes 12–13, 
20. 
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II. CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRIAGE 
A. Meyer v. Nebraska 
Loving is located among the Supreme Court’s decisions protecting 
sexual/familial privacy/autonomy as fundamental rights under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Such opinions, when pronouncing 
the right to marry, demonstrate a strange credulity, superficiality, and 
sparseness in articulating grounds for Constitutionally defending marriage. 
The manner in which they do so—and, in particular, the manner in which 
civil marriage erroneously or oppressively substitutes for a more general 
enfranchisement of sex, family, and marriage’s other alleged ends—points 
to general challenges in U.S. Constitutional doctrines on fundamental 
rights.  
An early case in which the Supreme Court opined on the fundamental 
right to marriage was Meyer v. Nebraska,8 which in 1923 declared 
unconstitutional a statute mandating that public education through eighth 
grade be conducted in English only.9 Decided under the doctrine of 
substantive due process, the Meyer Court found that: 
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint, but also the right . . . to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according 
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.10 
Thus marriage, along with contract, labor, education, reproduction, 
parenting, and religion form for the Meyer Court the exemplary canon of 
substantive due process. However, one’s liberties here are limited to 
“common” occupations, “useful” knowledge, conscience as regards 
“worship[ing] God,” and privileges “essential” to “orderly” happiness.11 
The meaningful determination of such fundamental freedoms depends 
fundamentally upon one’s interpretation of the foregoing modifiers. 
 
 
 8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 9. Exceptions were granted for instruction in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. Id. at 401. 
 10. Id. at 399 (quoted in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 768 (2d ed. 2002)). 
 11. Id.  
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B. Loving v. Virginia 
Qualified fundamental freedoms are similarly announced in Loving, 
where the fundamental right to marriage occupies its first direct holding by 
the Supreme Court. The Court considered Virginia laws which civilly 
prohibited and criminally penalized marriage between Whites and non-
Whites—with the absurd and spectacular exception of Pocahontas’s 
descendants.12 The Court found that Virginia’s laws violated the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Regarding equal protection, the Court considered the laws’ racial face and 
racist purpose: 
[T]he Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, 
especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the “most 
rigid scrutiny,” and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be 
shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible 
state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it 
was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. . . . 
 There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent 
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. 
The fact that Virginia only prohibits interracial marriages involving 
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications [are] 
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. . . . There can be 
no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of 
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause.13 
Thus Loving continues the general work and particular logic of Brown 
v. Board of Education,14 identifying any racial classification as dubious, 
and invidious racial discrimination as damned, under the Equal Protection 
Clause. Justice Warren’s conclusion is confusing and, I think, confused 
insofar as the first paragraph above leads him to the conclusion that when 
there is “no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial 
discrimination which justifies [racial] classification,” then such 
classification is unconstitutional. Justice Warren, though, seems to 
ultimately suggest that racial classifications are as such unconstitutional, 
at least in regard to the fundamental right to marriage. Justice Warren 
 
 
 12. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1967). 
 13. Id. at 11–12. 
 14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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contends that “racial classifications” themselves “violat[e] the central 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause,” despite suggesting just prior that 
such classifications—though requiring strict scrutiny—might well be 
justified if “necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state 
objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.” This slippage between race-
as-category and racism-as-content is important. Despite Loving’s 
recognition and condemnation of White Supremacy, the opinion’s 
rationale cultivates the anti-anti-subordination conceits of colorblind 
Constitutionalism.15  
Justice Warren then turns to the Due Process Clause: 
These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without [due 
process]. . . . Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” 
fundamental to our very existence and survival. . . . To deny this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classifications embodied in these statutes [surely denies due 
process].16 
Here too Justice Warren’s less than satisfactory distinction among 
racial classifications is troubling. Troubling too is Justice Warren’s 
unelaborated suggestion that mixed-sex marriage is fundamental to “our 
very existence and survival.” Like the suggestive and heavily qualified 
substantive due process canon listed in Meyer, the allegedly self-evident 
fundamentality of marriage asserted in Loving is perplexing. In suggesting 
that marriage is “fundamental” to human “existence and survival,” Justice 
Warren must mean that marriage is a literal prerequisite for the 
continuation of the species through procreative reproduction. However, 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 521, 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
See also Tucker Culbertson, Another Genealogy of Equality: Further Arguments against Colorblind 
Constitutionalism, STAN. J. OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES (forthcoming 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with Washington University Law Review): 
 On the back of Brown . . . the Courts’ decisions in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. [488 
U.S. 469 (1989)], Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena [515 U.S. 200 (1995)], and Shaw v. 
Reno [509 U.S. 630 (1993)] [which are emblematic but not exhaustive of contemporary 
colorblind Constitutionalism] . . . at first glance depart fully from their . . . predecessors. 
Rather than citing the strict, self-evident boundary between the good and bad races, as the 
Dred Scott Court did [60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406–09 (1856)], and rather than identifying a 
cruel or derogatory will as the meaning of racial inequality, as the Plessy Court did [163 U.S. 
537, 551 (1896)], [contemporary colorblind Constitutionalism] radically expands rather than 
refining the logic of Brown by presuming the presence of evil in any racial delineation in any 
government practice. 
 16. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
Washington University Open Scholarship











civil marriage is clearly neither necessary nor sufficient for procreative 
reproduction, let alone for the survival of offspring.  
Also troubling is Justice Warren’s unargued defense of marriage as 
“one of the ‘basic civil rights of man.’”17 Historically, this claim must 
mean that Heterosexual civil marriage is among the practices imagined by 
certain revolutionary eighteenth-century French, English, and American 
writers as essential to human nature and happiness.18 Even if this claim is 
true, should “the basic rights of man” be so simply and self-evidently 
defended or expanded under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Reconstruction Constitution? How can any of the modern Euro-American 
“rights of man” be so self-evidently sacred when the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s call for Reconstruction simultaneously (as in Loving) up-
ends long-held practices of racial segregation and long-claimed rights of 
racial supremacy? Racial caste, of course, was historically endorsed 
alongside, or among, the rights of man. Justice Warren may be right that 
the “basic rights of man” included Heterosexual marriage, but they surely 
did not enfranchise African, Indian, Carib, or other women excluded for 
economic, political, religious, and/or biological reasons from the 
categories of “man” and “citizen.”19 As such, Justice Warren’s excoriation 
of the rights of racial caste renders untenable his simplistic defense of 
Heterosexual civil marriage as among “the ‘basic civil rights of man.’” 
The foregoing criticisms of Justice Warren’s claims about species 
reproduction and the civil rights of man cumulatively suggest that 
Loving’s defenses of marriage are sparse to the point of superficiality. 
They are also logically and historically unsound because they were uttered 
in the context of Constitutional Reconstruction. 
 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. See generally THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, pt. 1 (1792). 
 19. The revolutionary United States Constitution, and subsequent interpretations thereof, of 
course explicitly and frequently instantiated racial caste. Indeed, racial slavery was one of only a very 
few individual rights mentioned in the articles of the revolutionary Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 9; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. V. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10 at 4–5, 281–85, 
485–87. Hence, the Reconstruction Constitution. 
 The French “Rights of Man and Citizen” similarly excluded racialized and subordinated peoples. 
The Friends of the Negroe, as well as various emissaries from the French colonies, argued that the 
“Rights of Man” should necessarily call for the full equality of multiracial persons, the emancipation 
of slaves, and an end to racial caste generally. See C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS, Ch. 2–5 
(Vintage Press 1989). The Revolutionary French National Assembly consistently ignored, repressed, 
rejected, or granted and retracted such extensions of the “basic civil rights of man” to non-Whites. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/3











C. Zablocki v. Redhail 
Eleven years after Loving, in Zablocki v. Redhail,20 the Supreme Court 
offered its most extensive exposition of the fundamental right to marry. As 
with Loving, Zablocki engages the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike Loving, Zablocki does not simultaneously 
rule under the Due Process Clause—to the chagrin of two concurring 
Justices. 
In Zablocki, the Court considered a state statute requiring that people 
pay all owed child support and prove they have no children in the state’s 
care before receiving a marriage license. In finding the statute 
unconstitutional, Justice Marshall’s opinion closely resembles Justice 
Warren’s in Loving by unequally and illiberally privileging the particular 
interests, identities, and traditions of mixed-sex civil marriage even as 
Justice Marshall understands himself to be enfranchising constitutional 
freedoms for persons historically subordinated, stigmatized, or ignored by 
the civil marriage regimes. Justice Marshall notes at the outset of the 
Zablocki opinion: 
 It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on 
the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, 
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships [for] it would 
make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to 
other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to 
enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our 
society.21 
Thus, the self-evident virtues of mixed-sex marriage are affirmed, even 
as states’ interests in promoting nuclear and/or affluent families are 
denied. And like Justice Warren in Loving, Justice Marshall irrationally 
imagines marriage, sex, reproduction, and family to be necessarily, 
normatively, logically, and legally coterminous. 
Strangely, Justice Marshall suggests that strict scrutiny is not always 
necessary for impositions on the right to marry, since there are reasonable 
regulations of marriage in which states may legitimately engage.22 Thus, 
 
 
 20. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 21. Id. at 386. 
 22. Id.: 
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest 
that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for 
marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that 
Washington University Open Scholarship











Justice Marshall can avow Califano v. Jobst,23 in which the Court upheld 
the Social Security Act’s termination of dependent disabled children’s 
benefits upon their marriage to any person not also receiving Social 
Security benefits.24 This infringement was alleged by the Court to be a 
consequence, and not a preemption, of marriage, and was thus deemed 
insignificant.25 A unanimous Court held that “[a] general rule is not 
rendered invalid simply because some persons who might otherwise have 
married were deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were 
burdened thereby.”26  
Justice Marshall’s qualification of marital rights in Zablocki is typical, 
strange, and revealing insofar as it makes clear the inherent violability of 
any allegedly fundamental Constitutional right. However, Justice 
Marshall’s navigation of this traditional (if not inevitable) c/Constitutional 
paradox is uniquely troubled. By stipulating that strict scrutiny is not 
necessary for rational and legitimate impositions on the fundamental right 
to marry, Justice Marshall seems to propose a standard for determining 
regarding standards of Constitutional review that resembles the most 
plaintiff-hostile standard of review. This tautology is obstructionist in 
effect. Nonetheless, such is the character of Justice Marshall’s 
rationalization in Zablocki of Jobst’s approval of the Social Security Act’s 
disparate governance of disabled people, its disparate governance of 
married people, and its disparate impact on the poor. Justice Marshall 
concludes that strict scrutiny should apply only if governmental action 
directly and substantially infringes the fundamental right to marry.27  
To summarize the cumulative motion of Marshall’s opinion:  
Because, 
(1) some governmental impositions around marriage would pass our 




do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may 
legitimately be imposed. 
 23. 434 U.S. 47 (1977). 
 24. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386–87. 
 25. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 391 (Burger, J., concurring): 
 Unlike the intentional and substantial interference with the right to marry effected by the 
Wisconsin statute at issue here, the Social Security Act provisions challenged in Jobst did not 
constitute an “attempt to interfere with the individual’s freedom to make a decision as 
important as marriage,” and, at most, had an indirect impact on that decision. It is with this 
understanding that I join the Court’s opinion today. . . . (internal citations omitted). 
 26. Califano, 434 U.S. at 58 (quoted in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 771). 
 27. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 376. 
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(2) require plaintiffs to demonstrate greater harm even than is 
demanded by our most plaintiff-hostile standards of review, in order 
to determine,  
(3) how plaintiff-hostile our standard of review should be. 
Requiring would-be wedders to pay child support28 and would-be 
divorcees to pay administrative fees,29 for Justice Marshall and the Court, 
were apparently sufficiently direct and substantial impositions on civil 
marriage as to warrant strict Constitutional scrutiny and a finding of 
Constitutional violation. Conversely, the Court deemed indirect, 
insubstantial, rational, and legitimate the Social Security Act’s termination 
of disabled persons’ financial support upon marriage to a person not on 
public benefits.30  
In Zablocki Justice Marshall found that, because of direct and 
substantial infringement, disparate impact upon the poor, and the irrational 
and not-least-restrictive attempt to collect child support payment through 
marital restriction, the law at issue violated the fundamental right to 
marry.31 Justices Stewart and Powell concurred with the Court’s judgment 
but thought the case was better decided under the Due Process Clause.32 
Both Justices wrote against Justice Marshall’s argued distinction between 
significant and insignificant restrictions on civil marriage.33 Stewart and 
Powell also noted and avowed marriage’s traditional—indeed, 
definitional—exclusivity. They recommended deference to “traditional” 
restrictions on the right to marriage,34 just as Justice Marshall avowed 
marriage as a “traditional” right. 
Justice Stewart wrote: 
 I do not agree with the Court that there is a “right to marry” in 
the constitutional sense. That right, or more accurately that 
privilege, is under our federal system peculiarly one to be defined 
and limited by state law. . . . A State may legitimately say that no 
one can marry his or her sibling, that no one can marry who is not at 
 
 
 28. Id. at 374. 
 29. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (finding filing and court fees for divorce 
proceedings unconstitutionally imposing upon the fundamental rights of the poor). 
 30. Califano, 434 U.S. at 47. 
 31. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374. 
 32. See id. at 395–96 (Stewart, J., concurring), 398–99 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 33. See id. at 395–96 (Stewart, J., concurring), 398–99 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 34. See id. 
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least 14 years old, that no one can marry without first passing an 
examination for venereal disease, or that no one can marry who has 
a living husband or wife. But . . . there is a limit beyond which a 
State may not constitutionally go. . . .  
. . . . 
 [The] State’s legitimate concern with the financial soundness of 
prospective marriages must stop short of telling people they may 
not marry because they are too poor or because they might persist in 
their financial irresponsibility. . . . A legislative judgment so alien to 
our traditions and so offensive to our shared notions of fairness 
offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 
Justice Powell, by contrast, did not, on the basis of the foundational 
exclusivity of civil marriage, reject the notion of a fundamental right 
thereto. Nonetheless, he contended: 
The Court does not present . . . any principled means for 
distinguishing between [regulations that directly and substantially 
interfere with a right to marry, and thus must pass strict scrutiny, 
and regulations that do not significantly infringe a right to marry, 
and thus need be only rational and legitimate]. Since state regulation 
in this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier to 
marriage or divorce, the degree of “direct” interference with the 
decision to marry or divorce is unlikely to provide either guidance 
for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight. 
. . . . 
[R]egulation has included bans on incest, bigamy, and 
homosexuality, as well as various preconditions to marriage, such as 
blood tests. . . . A “compelling state purpose” inquiry would cast 
doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have fashioned 
to govern marriage . . . .  
[However,] State power over domestic relations is not without 
constitutional limits. The Due Process Clause requires a showing of 
justification [when regulation is undertaken] in a manner which is 
contrary to deeply rooted traditions. . . . [The Due Process Clause 
 
 
 35. Id. at 392, 396 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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also] limit[s] the extent to which the State . . . order[s] certain 
human relationships while excluding the truly indigent . . . .36 
Justice Powell does not advocate overruling the marriage restriction in 
question because it infringes on marriage in a manner contrary to tradition 
and thus violates the Due Process Clause. Rather, Justice Powell suggests 
that the law is improperly exclusive of the poor and not substantially 
related to its ends, and, as such, violates the fundamental right to marriage.  
I find Justices Stewart’s and Powell’s formulations attractive and 
productive in their rejections of: (1) the government’s disparate 
disciplining of the poor; (2) the government’s irrational and not narrowly 
tailored lawmaking; and (3) Justice Marshall’s seeming imputation of the 
terms of rationality review into the decision regarding standard of review. 
They maintain, though, Justices Marshall’s and Warren’s strange 
insistence upon the tradition of marriage, and they maintain, moreover, an 
investment in the traditional descriptions and exclusions thereof. 
In this respect, Justices Stewart and Powell in Zablocki make more 
Constitutional sense than do Justices Marshall and Warren in Zablocki and 
Loving. The latter two Justices in those cases, respectively, defend 
marriage as tradition, while amending traditional marriage. Moreover, as I 
have noted already, both Justices presume, but do not convincingly 
defend, their claims that marriage entails sexual intercourse, reproduction, 
family, society, and survival. Both Justices likewise contradictorily hail 
the traditional “rights of man” as self-evident Constitutional liberties, even 
as their decisions are uttered after, and under, the Reconstruction 
Amendments’ obliteration of the self-evidence of man’s rights’ grounds.  
D. Lawrence v. Texas 
Similar problems attend the case of Lawrence v. Texas.37 Considering 
Lawrence helps consolidate the foregoing criticisms of the Court’s various 
engagements with the fundamental right to marriage under the 
Reconstruction Constitution.  
Lawrence did not—and indeed refused to—rule on the legitimacy of 
laws or customs prohibiting Homosexual civil marriage, but rather 
addressed laws criminalizing Homosexual sodomy.38 As Katherine Franke 
discusses, Lawrence overrules a law against Homosexual sex by 
 
 
 36. Id. at 396–97, 399–400 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 38. Id. at 570. 
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Constitutionally defending neither sex nor Homosexual sex as such. 
Rather, the Court valorized private sex among two people of either of two 
sexes conducted in furtherance of an intimate, presumably monogamous, 
romantic, familial, and not exclusively sexual relationship.39  
Lawrence, of course, has been construed as a mandate for extending 
the fundamental right of marriage to same-sex partners,40 as has Loving. 
Arguments like those in Lawrence, Loving, and most movements for 
“marriage equality” are much troubled. They champion traditional 
governmental practices as traditional liberties into which traditionally 
excluded classes deserve Constitutional admission. In the midst of calls for 
Reconstruction, they freeze—because they try to seize—the very 
governmental recognitions and benefits under challenge. As Jack Jackson 
and I argue elsewhere regarding “gay marriage” movements: 
[M]arriage and other euroheteropatriarchal norms and institutions 
are expelled from the realm of politics at the very moment when 
they should be subject to critique and challenge. That is, once the 
question hinges on homosexuals’ fixed, unitary difference and their 
formal juridical exclusion, the proper object of radical critique 
becomes that which must be presupposed for difference to exist and 
politics to act. . . .  
 [H]omosexuals’ queer difference/s are reduced to a formal 
analogy involving same- and cross-sex marriages, rather than 
inducing an interrelated consideration of same-sex partners . . . 
disadvantaged under the heteropatriarchal . . . marriage contract.41 
Katherine Franke’s comments on Lawrence are apt responses to 
Justices Warren’s and Marshall’s opinions in Loving and Zablocki:  
Marriage is not a freedom. Rather, it is a power . . . . The states have 
created a civil status called marriage, just as the states have created 
voting criteria and rights to inheritance. One either is or is not the 
 
 
 39. Katherine Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1399 (2004). Franke’s eloquent and important observations about Lawrence and same-sex marriage 
movements powerfully reflect the sentiments of countless queers not represented by mainstream 
Homosexual rights organizations. 
 40. Goodridge v. Dept. Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
 41. Jack Jackson & Tucker Culbertson, Proper Objects, Different Subjects, and Judicial 
Horizons in Radical Legal Critique (forthcoming in STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: UNCOMFORTABLE 
CONVERSATIONS IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY PROJECT at 
11, 13 (Martha Fineman, Jack Jackson & Adam Romero eds.)). 
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kind of person to whom the state has given the power to enter into a 
civil marriage, to exercise the vote, and to inherit property. . . .  
 I fear that Lawrence and the gay rights organizing that has taken 
place in and around it have created a path dependency that 
privileges privatized and domesticated rights . . . while rendering 
less viable projects that advance nonnormative notions of kinship, 
intimacy, and sexuality. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . Lawrence offers us no tools to investigate “kinds of intimacy 
[and sex] that bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to 
kinship, to the couple form, to property, or to the nation.”42 
Lawrence’s anti-Homophobic Heteronormativity resembles Loving’s 
maintenance of traditional Heterosexual marriage even while its traditional 
homoracial parameters are undone. Perhaps Justice Warren’s task in 
Loving, like Justice Kennedy’s in Lawrence, is unavoidably contradictory 
insofar as he seeks to open the United States Constitution to the possibility 
of enfranchising classes and practices traditionally—indeed, 
definitionally—excluded and oppressed thereby. However, in ruling under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that leaves the institutional 
exclusivity of civil marriage untroubled, their opinions fail. 
E. Conclusion 
In encountering the individual interests, identity classes, and cultural 
practices alienated or enfranchised by Virginia’s homoracial Heterosexual 
civil marriage policy, Loving should not have been reduced to questions of 
facially racial and/or purposively racist interference with the status of 
Heterosexual civil marriage as otherwise constituted. A richer and more 
rigorous description of the Lovings’ injuries might have exposed more 
foundational problems with civil marriage as Constitutional paradigm for 
family, sexuality, reproduction, parenting, care, property, and so on. Civil 
marriage has served as an exclusive cultural and economic power 
protecting the ideals, institutions, and interests of particular classes and 
traditions, thereby excluding heteroracial, Homosexual, polygamous, 
unmarried, and other familial and sexual partners therefrom. A proper 
contemplation of such a regime under the Reconstruction Constitution 
 
 
 42. Franke, supra note 39, at 1414–16 (quoting Lauren Berlant & Michael Warner, Sex in Public, 
24 CRITICAL INQUIRY 547, 558 (1998)). 
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should not merely amount to intermittent and incremental modification as 
urged on behalf of historically excluded individuals, classes, and practices 
newly deemed sufficiently similar to the traditionally superordinated status 
quo.43 
I find such c/Constitutionalism—which Loving in ways typifies—
politically reckless if not disingenuous, logically unsustainable, and 
legally solipsistic and detrimental. Precisely because the Lovings’ case 
demonstrates that homoracial Heterosexual civil marriage serves 
unconstitutionally illiberal and unequal ideals, interests, and institutions, 
Constitutional scrutiny of civil marriage (and reckonings with the 
provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment generally) requires 
a more profound set of philosophical, political, and constitutional tools 
than those offered by Loving. Whereas Loving announced a traditional 
right to Heterosexual marriage free from textual racial differentiation 
and/or dominative racist intent, we should now c/Constitutionally cognize 
the fundamental individual right to pursue sexual pleasures and construct 
social collectives—rights to have sex and family—as affirmative 
governmental obligations to not infringe, and indeed to enfranchise, the 
pursuit and enjoyment thereof.  
III. RECONSTRUCTING LOVING: HAVING SEX AND FAMILY 
Loving addressed a particular factual context involving facial and 
purposive white supremacist restrictions on Heterosexual civil marriage. 
However, the Loving Court constructs the analytic content of its inquiry in 
terms that merely replicate, rather than reveal, the full Constitutional 
stakes of the case. As a consequence, the Loving Court’s intervention 
against White Supremacy is ultimately less reconstructive than it might 
and should be. A guarantee of textually and purposively neutral access to 
civil marriage for heteroracial Heterosexual couples cannot enfranchise the 
equal liberty Loving means to defend.  
The spirit of Loving requires a fundamental rights jurisprudence 
different from those declaring formal, facial equality as regards fixed 
 
 
 43. See Jackson & Culbertson, supra note 41, at 17–18: 
[“Gay marriage” movements’] efforts at formal legal equality . . . work explicitly to 
sentimentalize, romanticize, and most importantly, naturalize the institution of marriage. . . . 
Rather than fusing certain feminist, queer, and Marxist critiques into a politics of 
Finemanesque reconsiderations, the rights-based politics of gay legal liberalism is working 
furiously to shore up and re-legitimate the institution of marriage. 
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identity classes’ rights to traditional governmental benefits.44 Calls for 
such recognition ground diverse critical legal theories on racial, sexual, 
and other subordination from at least the last two hundred years.45 In 
contemporary U.S. law and legal scholarship, such theories have 
consistently and articulately condemned the reduction of antisubordination 
jurisprudence to the formal inclusion of historically subordinated classes 
into traditional institutions and practices of governance;46 the reduction of 
equal protection to prohibitions of facial (including remedial and 
reparative) engagements with identity categories;47 and the reduction of 
non-discrimination to the prohibition of conscious, motivational animus.48  
Following in this tradition of antisubordination legal critique, this Part 
critiques the Loving Court’s Constitutional disestablishment of homoracial 
Heterosexual civil marriage regimes. While the Court announced a right to 
 
 
 44. See id. at 10 (discussing constructions of identity and constrictions of politics in debates on 
“gay marriage” and “sexual harassment”).  
Unnuanced articulations of foundational identity difference/s, we claim, feed and feed upon a 
truncated, submissive imagination of politics through liberal legal and economic doctrines 
and dogmas. Consciousness of the contingencies and intersections of difference/s and 
subordinations would lead, we argue, to more searching and substantial critical radical 
movement against the euroheteropatriarchal marriage contract, and the sexed and sexualized 
exploitation of . . . labor . . . .  
Id. 
 45. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY 52–76 (1995); WENDY BROWN, POLITICS OUT 
OF HISTORY 62, 84–90 (2001); Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26 
(Robert Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (arguing that religious freedoms under the liberal state merely 
displace religious discrimination to private spheres and admit subordinated believers into state systems 
built to their disadvantage); Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet, in MALCOLM X SPEAKS 23–44 
(George Breitman ed., 1965) (arguing that civil rights laws and politics in the United States cannot 
effectively empower African Americans, because “civil rights” extend the arms of an unjust state and 
thus merely subordinate differently, whereas “human rights” would force fundamental reconstruction 
of the state). Wendy Brown, Wounded Attachments, in STATES OF INJURY, supra; Power without Logic 
without Marx, in POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY, supra, at 62, 84–90 (2001).  
 46. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32–45 (1988); 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 41–42, 45–46 (1991); J.S. 
Mill, On the Subjection of Women, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 125, 128–33, 137–
41 (Modern Library Press 2002); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923 (2000). 
 47. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, “One More River to Cross” . . . Recognizing the Real 
Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies , in SHADES OF BROWN 49 (Derrick Bell 
ed., 1980); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 48. See generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL (2003); Charles R. Lawrence III, The 
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 
(1987); Ian Haney-Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist 
Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 
60 (4) J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 835–48; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1161 (1995).  
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Heterosexual civil marriage49 free from textual racial differentiation and/or 
dominative racist intent,50 I argue for fundamental individual rights to 
pursue erotic pleasures and construct social communities—rights to have 
sex and have family—and an affirmative governmental obligation not to 
infringe, and indeed to enfranchise, the pursuit and enjoyment thereof.51 
A. Precedent for the Rights to Sex and Family 
I am in no way the first to argue for fundamental rights to sex and 
family under the United States Constitution. Various movements, scholars, 
and precedents affirm these rights. The Constitutional right to cultivate 
and maintain family has been recognized by the Court in the context of 
marriage;52 child custody;53 child rearing;54 and extended family.55 The 
right to sex, by contrast, has been consistently unrecognized as such by the 
Court.56 Even Justice Blackmun’s momentous dissent in Bowers v. 
Hardwick57 argues that consenting adults behind their own closed doors 
are due Blackmun’s famous negative “right to be let alone”58 rather than 
an affirmative right to want and get erotic pleasure.  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court that overruled Bowers in 
Lawrence,59 was similarly unwilling to avow a right to sex. At its core, 
Lawrence was a challenge to undue, illegitimate, and unequal 
infringements upon people’s preferred forms of sex. As Justice Scalia 
notes in his dissent in Lawrence: “The Court embraces . . . Justice 
Stevens’ declaration in his Bowers dissent, that ‘the fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
 
 
 49. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 50. Id. at 11–12. 
 51. I will not discuss here in much depth my views on the Loving Court’s conceptions of racial 
inequality under the Equal Protection Clause. Though I will refer to that dimension of the opinion, this 
article will focus chiefly on the Court’s articulation of a fundamental right to marriage. 
 52. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); 
Loving, 388 U.S. at 1. 
 53. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 746 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 54. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 55. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 56. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, §10.2, at 768–82. 
 57. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 58. Id. at 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Omstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, Jr., dissenting)). 
 59. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, 
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and 
now is overruled.”). 
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practice.’”60 However, the Court’s “embrace” of this argument is 
insufficiently energetic or explicit, thus occasioning Justice Scalia’s 
compelling dissent.  
Rather than: 
(1) acknowledging the profundity of erotic pleasure in many human 
beings’ lives; 
(2) recognizing the consequent importance of erotic pleasure to our 
Constitutional conception of freedom; and   
(3) denouncing our deeply rooted national traditions of 
enfranchising sexual liberty only for an exclusive class of persons, 
preferences, and practices,  
Justice Kennedy instead perversely draws upon a range of traditional 
familial and sexual norms—including mixed-sex civil marriage—in order 
to deduce a Constitutional right to not be jailed for sex traditionally 
deemed immoral.61  
Similar to Lawrence’s repressed encounter with sexual liberty, the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on procreation,62 contraception,63 and 
abortion64 presumes but does not pronounce a right to engage in 
Heterosexual intercourse and family planning, given that the rights to 
control or refuse reproduction could theoretically correspond to a duty not 
to have intercourse, rather than a right to pregnancy prevention and 
termination free from irrational, illegitimate, or undue burdens. There is in 
such cases an implicit right to have sex and an explicit right to not have 
family. This right to sex, though, is too cabined as to place, manner, and 
gender of pleasure, just as the rights to family mentioned earlier are too 
cabined to marital and other exceedingly particular traditional paradigms.65 
 
 
 60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 61. Id. at 567 (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were 
it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. . . . When sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring.”) (emphases added). See also id. at 562 (“In our tradition the 
State is not omnipresent in the home . . . It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to 
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain 
their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice.”) (emphases added). 
 62. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 63. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 64. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
 65. Academics who have argued persuasively against heteronormative, heterocentrist, and 
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In Griswold v. Connecticut,66 the Court defends access to contraceptive 
technologies by reference to the fundamentality and privacy of marriage, 
rather than the right to have sex and manage family.67 Shortly thereafter, 
in Eisenstadt v. Baird,68 access to contraception was individualized and 
unhinged from marriage as a fundamental right by the Court. Nonetheless, 
the original defense of contraceptive technology is the sanctity of 
marriage, though contraception seems a most obvious matter of sexual and 
familial liberty that matters beyond marital bedrooms. Moreover, in 
Eisenstadt fundamental rights were not even discussed by the Court’s 
majority.69 Though the lower court found Massachusetts’s contraception 
ban a violation of single persons’ fundamental rights under the Due 
 
 
eurocentric c/Constitutional delimitations of rights to sex and family include Francisco Valdes, David 
Cruz, Janet Halley, Angela Harris, and Marc Spindelman. See generally Janet Halley, Recognition, 
Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in 
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001); Janet E. Halley, “Like 
Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY? 40 (Judith Butler, John Gillory & Kendall Thomas 
eds., 2000); Janet E. Halley, The Sexual Economist and Legal Regulation of Sexual Orientation, in 
SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 192–207 (David M. Estlund & Martha 
Nussbaum eds., 1997); David Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 4 (2002); Janet 
E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from 
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994); Angela Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs? Toward a 
Political Economy of Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 1539 (2006); Marc Spindelman, 
Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615 (2004); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s 
Horizon, 54 EMORY L. J. 1361 (2005); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: 
Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law 
and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 4 (2002); Francisco Valdes, Anomalies, Warts and All: Four Score of 
Liberty, Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341 (2004).  
 66. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 67. Id. at 486: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, 
older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way 
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial 
or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions. 
 68. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 69. Id. at 447 (“The question for our determination in this case is whether there is some ground 
of difference that rationally explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons 
. . . .”). The Court in Eisenstadt also stated: 
Of course, if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental 
freedoms under Griswold, the statutory classification would have to be not merely rationally 
related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the achievement of a compelling state 
interest. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618  (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1  
(1967). But just as in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), we do not have to address the 
statute’s validity under that test because the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient equal 
protection standard. 
Id. at n.7. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/3











Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,70 the Supreme Court found 
the statute to be an unconstitutional imposition upon single people under 
the Equal Protection Clause in light of Griswold’s defense of 
contraception for married couples.71  
In these cases, clustered temporally around Loving, there is a 
Constitutional expansion of individual rights regarding decisions about 
sexual activity and family constitution. But these Constitutional 
expansions of sexual and familial freedom become Constitutional 
reconfirmations of marriage, despite the neither necessary, nor sufficient, 
nor exhaustive connection of Heterosexual civil marriage to the liberties 
the Court defends. 
In excavating and explicitly affirming the fundamental rights to sex and 
family advanced but repressed in these cases, I am seconding and think 
myself continuing the work of William Brennan, David Cruz, Martha 
Fineman, Katherine Franke, Jack Jackson, and other legal scholars.72 
Fineman’s 1995 book, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family & Other 
Twentieth Century Tragedies,73 powerfully and persuasively makes a case 
against governments recognizing and privileging Heterosexual marriages 
as preferred forms of sexual and familial relations. Fineman argues that we 
should reorient family law around relations of inevitable and derivative 
dependency rather than conjugal pairing.74 Though Fineman’s critique 
centers marriage as a fulcrum of the right to family, she also understands 
 
 
 70. Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970). 
 71. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446–55. 
 72. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); FINEMAN, 
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY & OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); 
Cruz, supra note 65; Jackson & Culbertson, supra note 41. 
 73. See supra note 72. 
 74. Despite various interventions within family law in the United States by liberal antipatriarchal, 
antiracist, and antihomophobic movements (which have altered the once facially sexist, racist, and 
homophobic language of much marriage law and policy), Fineman argues that: 
 [I]n spite of such reform, the family continues to be defined as an entity, built on and arising 
from the sexual affiliation of two adults. This heterosexual unit continues to be considered as 
presumptively appropriate and it has ongoing viability as the core family connection. At 
worst, heterosexual marriage is viewed as merely in need of some updating . . . . 
FINEMAN, supra note 72, at 159. This brand of analogizing integration, Fineman shows, effectively 
maintains the operative inequalities and errors of governmental preferences for Heterosexual marriage 
in law and policy governing erotic pleasure and collective social units. Fineman notes the wide range 
of sexual and familial relationships that are not built upon marriage (whatever its racial or sexual 
orientations) and are therefore either neglected or disciplined and punished by governmental 
preferences for marriage. See id. at 165 (discussing single, divorced, and never-married mothers).  
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her critique of marriage to involve the right to sex.75 This leads Fineman to 
recommend against querying as to the inclusive reach of the fundamental 
right to marriage. Rather, she “propose[s] two recommendations for legal 
reform: the abolition of the legal supports for the sexual family and the 
construction of protections for the nurturing unit of caretaker and 
dependant . . . ”76  
The abolition of governmental preference for marriages in family law 
and policy would, Fineman argues, have the corollary effect of loosening 
governmental incursions on sex.77 I am not sure that the legal 
disestablishment of marriage that Fineman advocates would necessarily 
result in the disestablishment of governmental sexual morality. A 
government could acknowledge diverse familial relationships and still 
espouse homophobic or white supremacist sexual morality (by recognizing 
and privileging diverse families but continuing to prohibit or punish 
mixed-race/same-sex erotic pleasures), just as it could renounce 
Homophobia and White Supremacy but still maintain the model of the 
sexual family (by legalizing mixed-race/same-sex marriage but continuing 
to privilege and recognize marriages over other families).78 Precisely 
 
 
 75.  
 [I]n our society, marriage has historically been so venerated as to become a ‘sacred’ 
institution, the archetype of legitimate intimacy. . . . [Deviation] from the formal heterosexual 
paradigm of marriage has brought with it condemnation in the discourses of psychology, 
social work, and medicine. In law, marriage traditionally has been designated as the only 
legitimate sexual relationship. 
Id. at 146. 
 76. Id. at 228. 
 77. Id. at 229–30: 
 Adult, voluntary sexual interactions would be of no concern to the state since there would 
no longer be a state-preferred model of family intimacy to protect and support. Therefore, all 
such sexual relationships would be permitted—nothing prohibited, nothing privileged. . . .  
 Instead of seeking to eliminate this stigma [against unmarried sexual and familial 
relationships] by analogizing more and more relationships to marriage, why not just abolish 
the category as a legal status and, in that way, render all sexual relationships equal with each 
other and all relationships equal with the sexual?  
 78. For a limited view of federal and state judicial recognitions and refusals of Constitutional 
liberty for specifically “homosexual” acts, desires, and identities, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) (regarding homosexual sodomy); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); State v. 
Limon, No. 85,898, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2002), vacated by Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 
955 (2003) (mem.) and subsequently differently decided in State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005) 
(regarding disparate statutory rape penalties for same-sex offenders); Lofton v. Children & Family 
Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (regarding adoption by same-sex spouses). For commentary on 
these and similar decisions, see Katherine Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Spindelman, supra note 65; Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence 
Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 30 (2003); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004); Note, Unfixing Lawrence: 118 HARV. L. REV. 2858 (2005).  
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because the marital institution has collapsed sexual and familial relations, I 
believe the two fields must be individually articulated and disentangled 
from marriage.79 Further, the diverse forms of social community and 
sexual pleasure which are excluded from civil marriage regimes, and 
which I mean to include within the concepts of sex and family, are not all 
encompassed by the caregiver-dependant relation emblematized by 
Fineman’s mother-child paradigm. 
As such, courts, legislators, wardens, police officers, benefits 
administrators, zoning commissions, and other actors ought to recognize 
that persons in the United States have a right to have both sex and family 
in whatever manner they desire—unless of course there exists a 
compelling interest that is: (1) distinct from the moral and social privileges 
and prejudices the Fourteenth Amendment is meant to reconstruct; and (2) 
advanced by a necessary and narrowly tailored law.80 In what follows I 
offer logical, political, and constitutional grounds for this argument.  
B. Logical Objections to the Right to Marriage 
Logically, civil marriage cannot rightly be a fundamental 
Constitutional right.81 Civil marriage regimes are positive and particular 
governmental means for enfranchising some set of instrumental and 
ideological ends, which are energetically recited in cries against and 
defenses of civil marriage. All of civil marriage’s imaginable ends might 
be achieved without a marriage, and none of those ends are guaranteed by 
the mere fact of a marriage alone. Such is the relation between every end 
and any single means. As such, it is the ends of civil marriage which 
should be deemed fundamental Constitutional rights. Instead, these ends 
ironically become grounds for deeming civil marriage itself a fundamental 
right—despite the fact that civil marriage regimes can only ever be one of 
many unnecessary and insufficient means to the ends that allegedly 
recommend it.  
 
 
 79. Moreover, in arguing for affirmative and negative governmental obligations regarding 
people’s rights to have sex and family, I imagine that sexual families, including mixed-sex same-race 
marriages, may well still deserve and rightly demand recognition and privilege from governments as 
sexual and familial relationships, but they may not do so solely on the basis of their racial, sexual, 
religious, or marital identity. 
 80. There are clearly rights, needs, desires, and interests beyond having sex and family involved 
in the nebulous ends of marriage enfranchised by the Loving Court.  
 81. I do not intend here to claim that marriage (most broadly defined) could never be an end in 
itself under any constitutional order. Hence my attempt—despite fearing that some readers will find it 
insubstantial or irritating—to consistently distinguish between constitutional and Constitutional 
matters. See discussion supra notes 3–4. 
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By mistaking means for ends in this way, the Court in Loving and 
Zablocki self-evidently avows the recognitions and privileges of civil 
marriage, even while the historical parameters of that very regime are 
condemned as illiberal and unequal. This seemingly contradictory 
engagement impairs the Court’s constitutional inquiries and its 
Constitutional outcomes, mistaking the synthetic facts of particular cases 
for an analytical c/Constitutional rule by which to decide them. However, 
if we do heed logic and identify the ends of marriage as constitutionally 
fundamental, we must then question not only conscriptions of 
governmental recognition and privilege to homoracial Heterosexual 
marriages, but also the conscription of such recognition and privilege to 
civil marriage at all, whatever its racial or sexual parameters.82  
C. Political Objections to the Right to Marriage 
The preceding section has broad, important, political consequences. 
These consequences are specifically political because they concern the 
ways in and wills with which individuals, communities, corporations, 
governments, and others apprehend, understand, and engage human needs, 
social problems, and public policies. If persuasive, the preceding claims 
(that civil marriage is merely one means to constitutional ends for which it 
is neither necessary nor sufficient) urge new approaches to the human 
needs, social problems, and public policies surrounding civil marriage 
regimes. Because civil marriage is unnecessary and insufficient for its 
ends, even the most obviously and seemingly unidimensionally 
discriminatory dimensions of such regimes (e.g. exclusions of heteroracial 
and Homosexual spouses) should be represented and redressed in ways 
that emphasize neither expansions of nor integrations into civil marriage 
regimes.  
Many seemingly unrelated and unallied communities, policies, injuries, 
and issues become visibly politically connected when we challenge (for 
example) racist or homophobic marital regimes as improperly impinging 
 
 
 82. To import particular factual analyses—regarding Heterosexual marriage, White Supremacy, 
and Homophobia—into fundamental rights doctrine is improper and leads to the nonconversant 
debates between advocates of homosexual marriage equality and those of traditional heterosexual 
marriage. The former reasonably assert that they cannot be denied marriage on the basis of sex 
differentiation, gender normativity, or homophobia, while the latter reasonably claim that marriage, by 
its very definition, is a heterosexual institution and cannot accommodate Homosexuals. There may be 
valuable cultural contestation, negotiation, and conflict in such debates. However, as a constitutional 
matter, such debates are unhelpful. They are also productively avoided if any failure to privilege or 
recognize the rights to sex and family are strictly scrutinized. Cf. FINEMAN, supra note 72 (arguing for 
the disestablishment of heterosexual marital privilege and the support of care-taking relationships).  
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on the rights to sex and family. Arguments about whether unmarried 
same-sex spouses ought to receive the same reciprocal vocational benefits 
granted to married cross-sex spouses become more general, complex, and 
meaningful political questions about the need for and cost of human 
health, care, and wellness.  
Reframing The Marriage Question83 as a reconstructive demand for 
equal sexual and familial liberty might enable our c/Constitutional politics 
to be more than an anachronistic, chronically late, analogical, incremental, 
and exclusive expansion of presently unconstitutional and inherently 
unjust practices of governance. By rejecting the conception of marriage as 
Constitutional end, fundamental right, or necessary or sufficient means 
thereto, we can more properly enfranchise and not infringe the ends of 
marriage. Constitutionalizing fundamental rights to sex and family would 
lead us to scrutinize the White Supremacist marital governance at issue in 
Loving (and Homophobic and/or Heterocentrist institutions challenged by 
Homosexual marriage movements) only and always along with (for but a 
few examples): 
• visitation policies in prisons and other detention facilities that 
allow access only to certain (e.g., immediate, biological, etc.) 
family members84  
• visitation restrictions in prison generally, given the right to have 
sex and family85  
• penalties or privileges for marital, sexual, or other categories of 
families in the allocation of public benefits86 
 
 
 83. By calling discussions about civil marriage and fundamental rights “The Marriage Question,” 
I mean to suggest that such discussions (like current debates over Homosexual marriage) reductively 
and sensationally represent a single, monumental question. My phrasing references other such 
monumental, contentious, and often reductive considerations, such as those involving White and Male 
Supremacy. See, e.g., KARL MARX ET AL., THE WOMAN QUESTION (Selected Writings) (1952); 
THEODORE STANTON, THE WOMAN QUESTION IN EUROPE (1884); Thomas Carlyle, Occasional 
Discourse on the Negro Question, FRASER’S MAGAZINE (1849); J.S. Mill, The Negro Question, 
FRASER’S MAGAZINE (1850). 
 84. Prisoners’ and detainees’ visitation privileges presently may be restricted so long as such 
restrictions bear a rational relation to any penalogical goal. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See 
ACLU, Know Your Rights: Visitation in Prisons, www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file769_ 
25745.pdf for a general and accessible annotated introduction to the Constitutionality of restrictions on 
visits to incarcerated persons and pretrial detainees. In particular, note the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (establishing that recurrent violation of substance 
use policy justifies suspending visitation privileges for inmates). 
 85. Id. See Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1996), for the argument that conjugal visits 
may be Constitutionally denied to prisoners and detainees.  
 86. Consider the Bush administration’s “Initiative for Healthy Marriage.” See Robert E. Rector, 
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• prohibitions of sex toys87 
 
 
Melissa G. Pardue & Lauren R. Noyes, “MARRIAGE PLUS”: SABOTAGING THE PRESIDENT’S EFFORTS 
TO PROMOTE HEALTHY MARRIAGE, Heritage Foundation, Aug. 22, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/Welfare/BG1677.cfm: 
Recognizing the widespread benefits of marriage to individuals and society, the federal 
welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996 set forth clear goals to increase the number of two-
parent families and reduce out-of-wedlock childbearing . . . President Bush has sought to 
meet the original goals of welfare reform by proposing, as part of welfare reauthorization, a 
new model program to promote healthy marriage. The proposed program would seek to 
increase healthy marriage by providing individuals and couples with: 
• Accurate information on the value of marriage in the lives of men, women, and 
children;  
• Marriage-skills education that will enable couples to reduce conflict and 
increase the happiness and longevity of their relationship; and  
• Experimental reductions in the financial penalties against marriage that are 
currently contained in all federal welfare programs. . . .  
The proposal creates two separate funds to promote marriage. In the first, $100 million per 
year would be provided in grants to state government for programs to promote healthy 
marriage. Participation would be voluntary and competitive. States would neither be required 
to participate nor guaranteed funds; instead, they would compete for funding by submitting 
program proposals to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The states 
with the best proposals would be selected to receive funds. States receiving funding would be 
required to match federal grants with state funds. In the second fund, another $100 million per 
year would be allocated in competitive grants to states, local governments, and non-
government organizations. 
 Both funding pools could be used for a specified set of activities consistent with the 
overarching strategy of promoting healthy marriage. These activities would include: 
• Public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and skills needed to 
increase marital stability and health;  
• Education in high schools on the value of marriage, relationship skills, and 
budgeting;  
• Marriage education, marriage skills, and relationship skills programs, which 
may include parenting skills, financial management, conflict resolution, and job 
and career advancement, for non-married pregnant women and non-married 
expectant fathers;  
• Pre-marital education and marriage-skills training for engaged couples and for 
couples or individuals interested in marriage;  
• Marriage-enhancement and marriage-skills training for married couples;  
• Divorce-reduction programs that teach relationship skills;  
• Marriage mentoring programs that use married couples as role models and 
mentors in at-risk communities; and  
• Programs to reduce the disincentives to marriage in means-tested aid programs, 
if offered in conjunction with any of the above activities.  
 87. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 13A-12-200.2(A)(1) (2006), which states:  
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, 
or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as 
useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for anything of pecuniary value. 
The 1998 law was upheld again by a three judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit on February 14, 2007. 
See Williams v. King, No. 06-11892, 11th Cir., Feb. 14, 2007, available at http://www.ca11. 
uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200611892.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2007): 
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• prohibitions of adultery88 
• prohibitions of Homosexuals’ adoptions89 
• exclusions of multipartner marriages from governmental 
recognitions or privileges of family or sex90 
• exclusions of friendships from governmental recognitions or 
privileges granted civil marriages or other families91 
• governmental engagement with sexual morality and familial 
norms as such. 
Though there are numerous compelling exceptions, U.S. government 
agents generally should neither punish nor penalize people’s sexual 
 
 
The only question remaining before us is whether public morality remains a sufficient rational 
basis for the challenged statute after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. . . . 
The district court distinguished Lawrence and held, following our prior precedent in this case, 
Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001) (Williams II), that the statute survives 
rational basis scrutiny. Because we find that public morality remains a legitimate rational 
basis for the challenged legislation even after Lawrence, we affirm. 
 88. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.29—750.32 (2004). See Franklin Foer, Adultery, SLATE, 
June 15, 1997, at http://www.slate.com/id/1063/: 
 The United States inherited English common law, which made adultery, as well as 
fornication (sex between unmarried people) and sodomy (oral and anal sex), punishable 
crimes. In the mid and late 19th centuries, when states wrote their criminal codes, they 
incorporated these sex laws. Twenty-six states continue to have anti-adultery laws on the 
books. These laws vary considerably. Some define adultery as any intercourse outside 
marriage. According to others, it occurs when a married person lives with someone other than 
his or her spouse. In West Virginia and North Carolina, simply “to lewdly and lasciviously 
associate” with anyone other than one’s spouse is to be adulterous . . . Punishments also vary. 
Adultery is a felony in Massachusetts, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Idaho, and a misdemeanor 
everywhere else. 
See also John Flesher, Judges Footnote On Adultery Stirs a Tempest In Michigan, WASH. POST, Jan. 
19, 2007, at A08, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/ 
AR2007011801777.html (discussing People v. Waltonen, No. 270229 (Mich. Ct. App., LC No. 06-
015110-FC) (Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://courtofappeals.mijud.net/documents/OPINIONS/ 
FINAL/COA/20061107_C270229_28_270229.OPN.PDF) (last visited Nov. 26, 2007)). 
 89. Lofton v. Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding no fundamental 
right to homosexual adoption and a rational, legitimate purpose in allowing only heterosexuals to 
adopt). 
 90. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 738–40 (Utah 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1371 
(2007) (upholding criminal conviction for bigamy despite the Supreme Court’s recent invalidation of 
laws against “homosexual sodomy” in Lawrence v. Texas).  
 91. See Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007) (arguing that 
friendships should be legally recognized and supported equally with families, because (1) friends 
perform many of the vital functions presumed to be, but often not, performed by families, and (2) legal 
recognition of friendship could innovatively advance a primary mission of contemporary family law—
the dismantling of gender inequalities that thrive in “the family” as defined, produced, and disciplined 
by liberal patriarchal states and societies). 
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pleasures and familial collectives, but rather must enfranchise their 
experience and actualization of liberty through both sex and family.  
D. Constitutional Objections to the Right to Marriage 
The foregoing logical and political claims prompt an argument about 
constitutional theory and United States Constitutional doctrine. When 
governmental practices or institutions—such as those prohibiting 
miscegenation, sodomy, and adultery—are challenged as unconstitutional, 
such practices and institutions cannot be queried solely as to their 
imposition on or exclusion of the class or individual challenging it. Rather, 
when fundamental rights are at issue, what must be scrutinized are the 
practice’s or institution’s general construction, capacity, necessity, and 
sufficiency as means to stated Constitutional ends in light of their 
allegedly exclusive character. Fundamental rights under the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses ought not be defined as existing 
governmental institutions or traditional cultural practices, and ought not be 
deemed to have been violated only when fixed identity classes are facially 
differentiated or purposively dominated by law. Again, such factors are, of 
course, relevant as the actual context, but cannot serve as the analytic 
content of fundamental rights, because such factors cannot (singly or in 
sum) account for the range of subordinating logics or techniques requiring 
c/Constitutional Reconstruction. Such factors will surely ground the 
outcome of the case at the level of synthetic description and procedural 
mandate, but such synthetic particulars are improper as components of 
constitutional theories and Constitutional doctrines.  
My argument here raises contentious themes regarding doctrines on the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Regarding the former, how is 
inequality to be apprehended, evidenced, and understood? And how are we 
to c/Constitutionally characterize individuals, classes, and practices 
subjected to inequality? Regarding the Due Process Clause, what role does 
tradition play in defining, extending, limiting, or otherwise constructing 
fundamental liberties? And how ought we characterize such liberties? At 
what level of abstraction should an interest or practice be described when 
advanced as a right?  
1. Class and Reconstruction 
Constitutional focus on the facial differentiation or intentional 
subordination of fixed identity classes thwarts c/Constitutional 
Reconstruction. It does not require the obvious or inherent traces of White 
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Supremacy and Homophobia evident in many laws prohibiting 
miscegenation, criminalizing sodomy, or defending traditional marriage to 
render a systemic violation of the fundamental rights of a historically and 
presently subordinated group. The policing and punishment of unmarried 
African American families, lovers, and other cohabitants in the wake of 
the Civil War, which Katherine Franke importantly recounts and 
theorizes,92 demonstrates a racially and sexually disciplinary regime that 
worked to reinforce and reproduce White Supremacy. This regime, 
though, did not operate by withholding but rather by extending the terms 
of civil marriage. What is wrong with the law at issue in Loving, and with 
Constitutional amendments or other laws that disadvantage same-sex 
spouses, is also wrong with laws mandating marriage for cross-sex 
cohabitants and laws overbroadly benefiting any married couples over any 
other sorts of families. The problem with all such laws is their categorical 
and thus overbroad and overnarrow privileging of certain classes and 
practices over or under others, with respect to the ways in which such 
classes may practice and the state may recognize persons’ fundamental 
rights to have sex and family. 
2. Tradition and Abstraction 
However traditional or foundational a particular government practice or 
institution may be, it still must be articulable as a means to an end beyond 
itself. Even in the least scrutinizing judicial review of even the least 
traditional government practice, plaintiffs and defendants must articulate 
interests and rights beyond the particular governmental practice or 
institution challenged, and beyond the particularly excluded class 
presently pleading for relief, so as to establish the constitutional 
background against which the particular state actions, identity classes, and 
individual interests at issue acquire their Constitutional meaning.  
The federal and state constitutions—many written against monarchical 
sovereignty and feudal caste, and reconstructed against states’ sovereignty 
and racial caste—cannot contain Due Process and Equal Protection clauses 
meant to function as reticent but supreme civil codes enshrining for 
posterity the precisely and positively established government institutions, 
 
 
 92. See Katherine Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African 
American Marriage, 11 YALE J.L. & HUM. 251 (1999); see also Franke, supra note 39, at 1420–25 
(discussing discipline and policing of African Americans in the postbellum South through marital 
licensing and other habitation regulations).  
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cultural traditions, class distinctions, political philosophies, or historical 
moralities of an ancient, authoritative caste. 
A fundamental rights jurisprudence anchored to tradition understood as 
static, particular cultural practices, or state institutions renders the 
Constitution unable to ever apprehend, let alone redress, let alone prevent 
subordination that seems traditional, even definitional, until a century or 
two of war and diplomacy renders such inequality apparently unnatural 
and illiberal.  
Thus, it seems to me not only not ideal, but indeed anticonstitutional to 
fix fundamental rights analyses, and levels of Constitutional scrutiny 
generally speaking, too tightly to alleged traditions of the nation. It seems 
to me a contradiction of the Constitution’s fundamental rights clauses, of 
the general philosophical systems and historical context out of which they 
arise, and of the political aims of Reconstruction to suggest that, to be 
deemed a fundamental right, a plaintiff’s demanded liberty must conform 
to the government’s historical practices, prejudices, or privileges.  
Another argument regarding Due Process jurisprudence under the 
United States Constitution thus emerges. Fundamental rights must not be 
defined at the most specific level of abstraction discernible in the claims of 
plaintiffs or the canons of precedent. Doing so necessarily restricts 
fundamental rights to the institutions, practices, identities, and interests 
already rendered and recognized by the State.93  
Discussing and debunking Justice Scalia’s arguments regarding the role 
of tradition and descriptive abstraction in Due Process Clause 
jurisprudence will hopefully make my point clear. In Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., the Court considered a law under which “a child born to a married 
woman living with her husband is presumed to be a child of the 
marriage.”94 The law was challenged by a biological father (Michael) 
attempting to secure parental rights regarding his daughter (Victoria), 
whose mother was previously and continuously married to another man, 
but with whom Michael had an ongoing relationship, as he did with 
Victoria.95 In the plurality opinion in Michael H., Justice Scalia argues that 
the liberty interest under consideration must be described in the most 
specific abstraction derivable from the facts.96 Then, Justice Scalia 
 
 
 93. See Jackson & Culbertson, supra note 42, at 19 (“The integrationist politics of identitarian 
liberal legalism thus helps to effect and incite a double expulsion: expulsion of different and discordant 
subjects from the identitarian-imagined community and also expulsion of the proper objects of left 
movements from the field of political vision.”). 
 94. 491 U.S. 113 (1989). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1989). 
 95. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113–16. 
 96. Id. at 122–24. 
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suggests, we must decide whether this most specifically abstracted liberty 
has been traditionally protected in the United States: 
[T]he legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the 
relationship between persons in the situation of [father] Michael and 
[daughter] Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under 
the historic practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it 
has been accorded special protection . . . . [T]o the contrary, our 
traditions have protected the marital family . . . against the sort of 
claim Michael asserts.97 
Attached to this assertion is the following note from Justice Scalia: 
Justice Brennan insists that in determining whether a liberty interest 
exists we must look at Michael’s relationship with Victoria in 
isolation, without reference to the circumstance that Victoria’s 
mother was married to someone else when the child was conceived 
. . . . We cannot imagine what compels this strange procedure of 
looking at the act which is assertedly the subject of a liberty interest 
in isolation from its effect upon other people—rather like inquiring 
whether there is a liberty interest in firing a gun where the case at 
hand happens to involve its discharge into another person’s body.98 
Recall that Justice Marshall in Zablocki refers to the standards of 
rationality review in deciding whether to apply rationality review.99 Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in Michael H. is similar in that, as Laurence Tribe and 
Michael Dorf note,100 Justice Scalia recommends a jurisprudence that 
imputes the alleged governmental interest against the asserted liberty into 
the very definition of the liberty at issue. In doing so, “the state interest 
obliterates, without explanation and at the outset, any trace of the 
individual liberty at stake.”101 
 
 
 97. Id. at 127 n.6. 
 98. Id. at 110 n.4. 
 99. 434 U.S. at 376. 
 100. See Laurence Tribe & Michael Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1096–97 (1990) (quoted in CHOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 464–65). 
 101. Id.: 
When we automatically incorporate the factors that provide the state’s possible justification 
for its regulation into the initial definition of a liberty, the fundamental nature of that liberty 
nearly vanishes. . . . To state [fundamental rights] cases this way is to decide them in the 
government’s favor. Anyone is free to argue that [Roe v. Wade, New York Times v. Sullivan, 
or Mapp v. Ohio] was wrongly decided. But arguments to this effect must explain why the 
state interest overcomes the liberty interest. Under Justice Scalia’s . . . approach, by contrast, 
the state interest obliterates, without explanation and at the outset, any trace of the individual 
liberty at stake. 
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Tribe and Dorf also note that Justice Scalia’s discernment of the most 
specifically abstracted liberty interest in Michael H. is not only 
analytically problematic, but also deceptively question-begging, insofar as 
there are far more specific abstractions available: 
Justice Scalia’s formulation of the rights at stake as the rights of 
“the natural father of a child adulterously conceived” is . . . already 
a considerable abstraction. . . . The natural father in Michael H. had 
a longstanding, albeit adulterous and sporadic, relationship with the 
mother of his child. He also had fairly extensive, if sporadic, contact 
with his child. . . . A more specific [abstraction] of the issue than 
Justice Scalia gives us would be: what are the rights of the natural 
father of a child conceived in an adulterous but longstanding 
relationship, where the father has played a major, if sporadic, role 
in the child’s early development? 
  . . . [S]tarting from an even more specific [abstraction] of the 
case than did Justice Scalia, we have seen that he had no greater 
justification for abstracting away the father-child relationship than 
Justice Brennan had for abstracting away the adultery.102 
Jack Balkin argues a similar point regarding tradition as the definition 
of liberty: 
  [I]f sexual harassment directed toward women in the workplace 
and respect for marital privacy are both traditions, but only one is 
worth protecting, how do we tell the difference? 
. . . . 
. . . [W]hat is most troubling about Justice Scalia’s call for 
respecting the most specific tradition available is that our most 
specific historical traditions may often be opposed to our more 
general commitments to liberty or equality. . . . [D]ifferent parts of 
the American tradition may conflict with each other.103 
Thus, as a matter of constitutional theory and Constitutional law, and 
as a consequence of all the foregoing arguments, I suggest that we 
systematically reject fundamental rights doctrines under the federal or 
state constitutions that: 
 
 
  102. Id. at 1092–93. 
 103. J. M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1613, 1617–18 (1990) (quoted in CHOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 463). 
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• misidentify particular governmental means (e.g., civil marriage) 
as general constitutional ends (e.g., the rights to sex and family),  
• formalize inequality as the facial differentiation or intentional 
subordination of fixed or unitary identity classes, 
• hinge upon or ignore particular histories of subordination or 
traditions of the nation,104 or 
• craft constitutional questions and answers at the most specific 
degree of abstraction.105 
The particular contextual exclusions of mixed-race/same-sex spouses 
from civil marriage can only be decried or defended by calls to, and these 
exclusions should thus invoke a more robust general jurisprudence on, the 
constitutional ends of marriage—e.g., the rights to have sex and family. 
Such jurisprudence is evidently apt and necessary since mixed-race/same-
sex couples are perhaps emblematic, but in no way exhaustive, of the wide 
range of sexual and familial relationships denied or disadvantaged by the 
recognition and privilege historically afforded same-race, mixed-sex 
marriages in United States law, policy, and culture.106 As such, challenges 
to White Supremacist,107 Homophobic,108 Heterocentrist,109 and 
 
 
 104. Justice Blackmun voices a similar sentiment in his dissent from the Court’s opinion in 
Bowers, wherein he quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes’ contention that “‘[i]t is revolting to have no better 
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.’” 478 U.S. at 199 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARVARD L. REV. 
457, 469 (1897)). 
 105. As an alternative model, Randy Barnett suggests that the Court should—and, through 
Lawrence, has—embraced a libertarian conception of the Due Process Clause, one in which any claim 
of violated liberty—whether doctrinally sacrosanct or not—should trigger the searching review 
demonstrated in Lawrence, in which fundamentality and level of review are not correlated in nor 
central to the holding. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. 
Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21 (2003). 
Although it may be possible to cabin this case to the protection of “personal” liberties of an 
intimate nature—and it is a fair prediction that that is what the Court will attempt—for 
Lawrence v. Texas to be constitutionally revolutionary, the Court’s defense of liberty must 
not be limited to sexual conduct. The more liberties the Court protects, the less ideological it 
will be and the more widespread political support it will enjoy. Recognizing a robust 
“presumption of liberty” might also enable the court to transcend the trench warfare over 
judicial appointments. Both Left and Right would then find their favored rights protected 
under the same doctrine. When the Court plays favorites with liberty, as it has since the New 
Deal, it loses rather than gains credibility with the public, and undermines its vital role as the 
guardian of the Constitution. If the Court is true to its reasoning, Lawrence v. Texas could 
provide an important step in the direction of a more balanced protection of liberty that could 
find broad ideological support. 
Id. at 41. 
 106. See FINEMAN, supra note 72; Franke, supra note 92; Jackson & Culbertson, supra note 41. 
 107. I agree with the Court’s assessment in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 11–12, that laws 
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patriarchal110 recognitions or privileges of marriage should call for the 
c/Constitutional disestablishment of marriage as a necessary or sufficient 
condition for benefit or burden, and the Constitutional requirement that 
state and federal governments protect and not infringe persons’ formation 
of collective social units, or their pursuit of sexual pleasure, except in the 
case of the narrowest governmental undertaking of a most compelling 
governmental interest not among those undermined by the Reconstruction 
Amendments. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
That which “marriage equality” movements oppose must indeed be 
undone by Constitutional fundamental rights analyses, but the 
unconstitutional governmental structures challenged must not themselves 
provide the core terms for such analyses if we are to both (1) intercede 
against unfreedom and inequality long before they become systematic, 
longstanding, or sympathetic practices of subordination; and (2) 
enfranchise fundamental rights understood as general and diverse 
 
 
prohibiting heteroracial marriage in the United States amount to governmental White Supremacy and 
are thus immoral, irrational, illegitimate, and unconstitutional. 
 108. I think the recent proposals and ratifications of state and federal constitutional amendments 
stipulating explicitly that marriage is solely available to mixed-sex couples amount to governmental 
homophobia, in that they emerge from a broadly cultural and political rejection of homosexual 
equality, freedom, and identity. This historical context, like that of the restriction on homosexual 
representative political participation at issue in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), suggests a class-
based animosity which ought not minimally or otherwise elevate the level of constitutional scrutiny in 
cases involving Due Process and Equal Protection, but ought rather to suggest exactly why such laws 
necessarily fail even the most minimal standard of review. I believe class-based animosity—
demonstrable by text and context—can never yield a legitimate end or rational means. Evidence of 
such animosity necessarily, I believe, taints fundamental rights analyses (be it Due Process or Equal 
Protection under federal or state constitutions), such that the governmental action at issue must fail. 
Hence my genuine shock and dismay when encountering claims that there exists an animus-activated 
“heightened” rationality review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 620; 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
580 (2003), (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 109. Laws prior to the recent statutory and Constitutional clarifications of marriage’s exclusively 
heterosexual character are heterocentrist in that they presume the heterosexual couple as the center of 
all marriage. Similarly heterocentrist, though, are laws and movements that seek to include 
Homosexual marriages alongside the state’s recognition and privilege of Heterosexual marriages. Such 
laws continue to center marriage in its imagination of family and sex, and sex in its imagination of 
family, thus maintaining the heterosexual marital norm as the model of sex and family. As such, the 
inclusion of homosexuals in civil marriage regimes perpetrates the same unconstitutional act as 
homophobic or heterocentrist marital exclusions of homosexuals.  
 110. Virtually all laws governing heterosexual marriage were patriarchal in their preferential and 
differential treatment of men and women. For a thorough and astute history see FINEMAN, supra note 
72. 
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constitutional ends rather than overbroad and overnarrow traditional 
Constitutional means. 
The Lovings’ challenge to a law involving both sexual and racial 
governance of family, sexuality, reproduction, race, and gender should 
have called forth recognition of the complex, simultaneous, and multiple 
ways in which law can infringe on liberty and equality as regards family, 
sexuality, and identity. Instead, the Court presumes the legitimacy of 
illiberal and unequal sexual, religious, and other governance in order to 
condemn only the facial racial governance of antimiscegenation law. 
Regulations of sex and family, such as antimiscegenation law, infringe 
on liberty and equality in diverse ways by denying sexual and familial 
rights to persons because of their conscience, culture, identity, and desire. 
As a means to any of its possible ends—procreation, promises of care, 
well-reared children, sexual pleasure, etc.—civil marriage is neither 
necessary nor sufficient. As such, the status afforded civil marriage is 
irrational and illegitimate. Moreover, the status afforded civil marriage 
violates the fundamental rights to the ends of marriage owed to unmarried 
and unmarriable persons. The alleged and naturalized propriety of civil 
marriage as a biological, social, and political program can and should be 
rejected. Doing otherwise yields a jurisprudence that is logically 
untenable, politically unjust, and ultimately anticonstitutional. 
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